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The Plough, Gender Roles, and Corruption 
 
1. Introduction 
Cross-national empirical studies of corruption commonly find significant correlation between 
indices of corruption and women’s participation in the labour force and politics. Nations in which 
women play a greater role in economic and public life are found to suffer less corruption. A causal 
relationship, that the greater participation of women in the labor force and politics reduces national 
corruption, has been inferred. This has been controversial in that, first, it is possible unobserved 
aspects of national institutions and attitudes affect both corruption and women’s participation in the 
labor force and politics, so that the observed correlation between gender and corruption is spurious, 
and, second, that corruption may obstruct women’s participation in the labor force and politics, so 
that there is reverse causality.  Instrumental variables estimation might have settled the controversy 
but for the difficulty of finding credible instruments. This paper argues that a potential instrument 
may be found in historical geography. A recent study by Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) 
uncovers support for Boserup’s (1970) hypothesis that the ancient adoption of the plow, a heavy 
implement better suited to use by men, led to a gendered division of labor by which women made 
their economic contributions from home, and that this gave rise to persistent cultural norms 
prescribing domesticity in women. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) discover that countries in 
which a greater proportion of the population traces its ancestry to ethnic groups who adopted the 
plow continue to see lower women’s participation in the labor force and politics. This suggests that 
the geographical suitability of national ancestral lands to crops benefited by the use of the plow, is a 
potential instrument for women’s participation in economic and public life. Its use, it is 
demonstrated, yields a much weaker and statistically insignificant relationship between gender and 
corruption. The paper concludes that ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficients of 
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regressors measuring women’s economic and political influence, in regressions in which measured 
corruption is the dependent variable, are substantially biased.  
Swamy’s, Knack’s, Lee’s, and Azfar’s (2001) pioneering study of gender and corruption made 
the striking discovery that countries in which women make up larger shares of parliament, ministers, 
and the labour force are perceived to suffer less corruption. This was closely followed by Dollar’s, 
Fisman’s, and Gatti’s (2001) finding that perceived national corruption is negatively related to the 
proportion of parliamentary seats held by women. Whereas Swamy et al. (2001) were agnostic as to 
the reasons for correlation between gender and corruption, Dollar et al. (2001) suggested women are 
intrinsically more trustworthy and public-spirited than men. As shall be discussed, this has proven a 
contentious thesis. This nascent literature was then agitated by a dissenting opinion. Sung (2003) 
argued that the hitherto observed correlation between gender and corruption was spurious in being 
caused by correlation between a third factor, namely, liberal democracy, and each of gender and 
corruption. While Swamy et al. (2001) controlled for national political freedoms and Dollar et al. 
(2001) for civil liberties, these measured liberal democracy inadequately, contended Sung (2003).  In 
other words, the regression errors in the analyses by Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al. (2001) 
included unmeasured aspects of liberal democracy correlated with women’s empowerment, leading 
to bias in ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the effects of gender upon corruption. Sung 
demonstrated that once liberal democracy is extensively controlled for, women’s representation in 
ministerial cabinets, sub-ministerial officialdom, and parliament are reduced to statistically 
insignificant correlates of corruption. 
Correlation between the regression error and measures of women’s participation in the 
labour force and politics may also result from reverse causality.  Bjarnegard (2013) argues that 
corruption within political parties, consisting of ‘clientelism’, the exchange of personal favours for 
political support, is an impediment to women’s participation in politics. Such corruption relies on 
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networks, access to which requires a type of social capital, termed ‘homosocial’ capital, built on 
relationships between men. It is naturally difficult for female political aspirants to break into these 
masculine networks. Also, as noted by Frank, Lambsdorff, and Boehm (2011), corruption may 
hamper legal institutions’ ability to protect women against discrimination in the labour market and 
politics. 
There are two approaches to addressing correlation between the error term and measures of 
women’s participation in economic and public life in a regression in which a gauge of national 
corruption is the dependent variable. If the endogeneity is due to inclusion in the regression error of 
unobserved aspects of national institutions and attitudes correlated with women’s influence in the 
economy and politics, these aspects might be treated as country fixed-effects provided a time series 
of data were available. This is the tactic of Debski and Jetter (2015). The authors consider values of 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for the years 1998-2011 to constitute a 
time series. By their country fixed effects model, greater participation by women in economic and 
public life is not associated with perceptions of less corruption. This finding might have been a 
valuable contribution to the literature but for the authors’ error in considering values of the 
Corruption Perception Index to be intertemporally comparable. Transparency International warns 
that “CPI scores before 2012 are not comparable across time” 1. Intertemporal incomparability is a 
weakness as well of the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index. Further, even if suitable time 
series data were available, fixed effects estimation wouldn’t be a solution to the problem of reverse 
causality. 
Instrumental variables (IV) estimation is the other approach to addressing the potential 
endogeneity of measures of women’s influence in the economy and politics. A valid instrument must 
be uncorrelated with unobserved influences upon corruption. It must also be correlated with 
women’s participation in economic and public life, and it mustn’t itself be a direct influence upon 
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corruption. There is to date only one published account, by Chen (2013), of IV estimation of the 
effects of gender upon corruption. There are, broadly, two parliamentary electoral systems in the 
world’s democracies: majoritarian representation and proportional representation. In the 
majoritarian system, there is only one parliamentary seat per district. Hence, each political party 
fields but one candidate per district, and the candidate who wins the most votes is elected to 
parliament. On the other hand, there are multiple parliamentary seats per district in the proportional 
system. The proportion of these that a party wins is equal to the share of total votes cast in its 
favour. For example, a party winning 40% of total votes in a 10-seat district will have gained 4 of 
these 10 seats.  Chen (2013) argues that political parties are likelier to field female candidates when 
the system of representation is proportional. She reasons that, first, political parties, long dominated 
by men, will tend to field male candidates when electoral rules permit but one candidate per district, 
and, second, that parties are likelier to include women in their field of candidates in multi-seat 
districts in order to better attract female voters. Chen (2013) demonstrates that the proportion of 
women in parliament is significantly lower in democracies with majoritarian representation. She 
proceeds to use an indicator of this form of representation, together with an indicator of the 
institution of gender quotas in democracies with proportional representation, as instruments for the 
share of parliamentary seats held by women in a regression in which Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index is the dependent variable. This strategy yields the finding that women’s 
participation in politics significantly reduces corruption. However, the validity of Chen’s (2013) 
identifying instruments is questionable. Proportional representation was devised as a solution to the 
particular weakness of the majoritarian system that it is possible for the victor in a multi-party race 
to have won a minority of the vote, that is, possible for parliament to be unrepresentative of the full 
diversity of national political opinion. It might be argued that a nation that recognises this 
shortcoming and acts to remedy it by adopting proportional representation likely possesses 
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progressive institutions and attitudes intolerant of corruption. After all, proportional representation 
is the dominant electoral system of the liberal democracies of Western Europe famed for their good 
governance. In other words, an indicator of majoritarian representation may be correlated with the 
regression error. 
This study too employs IV estimation to address the potential endogeneity of measures of 
women’s participation in economic and public life, but its choice of instrument, based on nations’ 
ancestral geography, is more readily defended. Whereas a country’s electoral system is chosen by its 
polity, there is arguably little that is volitional about its ancestral geography, so that the likelihood of 
correlation between it and unobserved aspects of national institutions and attitudes with bearing on 
corruption, is remote. The particular feature of ancestral geography made use of is the suitability of 
nations’ ancestral lands to crops benefited by the use of the plough, that is, ‘plough-positive’ crops 
in Pryor’s (1985) parlance. Boserup (1970) proposed that the adoption of the plough in antiquity 
may have given rise to cultural norms prescribing domesticity in women that persist to this day. The 
plough, a heavy implement drawn by powerful draft animals difficult to control, is better suited to 
use by men. So its adoption may have led to a gendered division of labour by which women made 
their economic contributions from home. Perhaps it gradually came to be believed that women’s 
proper place was the home. Indeed, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) find that there is less female 
labour force participation, women’s ownership of businesses, and women’s representation in 
parliament in countries in which a greater proportion of the population traces its ancestry to ethnic 
groups that took up the plough. Since the plough was likelier to have been adopted in regions better 
suited to ‘plough-positive’ crops, it is likely that women’s participation in economic and public life is 
correlated with the suitability of nations’ ancestral lands to such crops.  In other words, not only is 
this feature of ancestral geography likely exogenous, it is also likely correlated with women’s 
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representation in the labour force and politics. This study finds that its use as an instrument turns 
the estimated relationship between gender and corruption statistically insignificant. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Since problematic explanations may be 
symptomatic of suspect findings, section 2 critiques existing explanations of statistically significant 
correlation between gender and corruption in cross-national OLS regressions.  Section 3 explains 
Boserup’s (1970) thesis of a connection between the ancient adoption of the plough and modern 
gender roles, and describes its testing by Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), with a view to 
establishing the plausibility of this study’s choice of instrument. Section 4 describes the data and 
presents estimates, both OLS and IV, of the effects of gender upon corruption towards 
demonstrating that OLS estimates are substantially biased. Section 5 summarises the study’s findings 
and presents its conclusions. 
 
2. Gender and Corruption: Problematic Explanations 
Commonly sizeable and significant OLS estimates of the effects of gender upon corruption 
have led researchers to conclude that women are either morally superior to men, more averse to the 
risk of being caught, or less endowed with opportunities for corruption. Of these explanations, the 
first has inspired conspicuous policy initiatives in parts of the world. For example, units of the traffic 
police forces of Lima and Mexico City and the customs service of Mexico have been feminised. The 
view that the induction of women into officialdom shall reduce corruption because of women’s 
moral superiority is, incidentally, the reverse of older views of feminine morality. For instance, both 
Plato and Aristotle held that women, since they were considered ruled by emotion, were morally 
inferior to men2. This view was shared by Eastern philosophers as well, such as the ancient Indian 
statesman-philosopher Kautilya3. Goetz (2007) drily notes that “the very traits that branded women 
as deficient in moral development, their concern to help and to please, are now seen as functional 
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for good governance reforms in developing and transitional societies”. In other words, traits 
ascribed to women once viewed as making for moral weakness are now seen as cornerstones of 
moral strength, that is, the definition of morality has changed. It may make little sense to consider 
women morally superior if notions of morality are mutable. Perhaps it is more useful to speak of 
honesty than morality. Are women more honest than men? 
Crime statistics supply a partial answer. By the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s crime 
statistics, women made up only 26.54% of all arrests in 20134. Men dominated all categories of crime 
save ‘prostitution and commercialized vice’. Men overwhelmingly dominated violent crime, but this 
may not be informative of gender differences in honesty since men may be more socialised, even 
hormonally predisposed, to violence. What of gender differences in arrests for non-violent crimes? 
While more men than women were arrested for non-violent crimes as well in 2013, the gender gaps 
were perhaps tellingly small in some categories. For example, women made up 39.9% of arrests for 
‘fraud’, 43.1% of arrests for ‘larceny-theft’, and 48.4% of arrests for ‘embezzlement’. It has been 
argued that crime isn’t merely the outcome of the perpetrators’ proclivities to dishonesty. There 
must be opportunity as well, and women may have fewer criminal opportunities than men, so that it 
is possible women shall be as likely as men to commit non-violent crime when there is no gender 
gap in opportunity. Perhaps this is why women made up virtually half of all arrests for 
embezzlement. As writes Dodge (2013), “the high number of women embezzlers is attributed to 
workplace opportunities that involve low-level occupations such as bookkeepers, bank tellers, or 
secretaries who have access to company funds”. In sum, crime statistics don’t strongly point to 
women’s greater honesty. 
Besides, social science experiments on honesty have been inconclusive. Frank’s, 
Lambsdorff’s, and Boehm’s (2011) survey of laboratory experiments on gender and corruption 
infers that “women are not necessarily more intrinsically honest or averse to corruption than men”. 
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A similar survey by Chaudhuri (2012) finds that “the evidence for greater incorruptibility on the part 
of women comes primarily from developed nations” with no “strong differences in developing 
countries where the problem of corruption is far more endemic”. There is traditional empirical 
evidence as well of the lack of a gender difference in corruptibility in the developing world.  For 
example, Vijaylakshmi (2007) finds “no significant gender difference in attitudes towards rent-
seeking or in actual levels of corruption between male and female representatives” in Indian local 
government. Since it may not then be asserted that women are universally more honest than men, 
significant correlation between gender and corruption in cross-national OLS regressions must be 
explained by either women’s greater risk aversion or their relatively fewer opportunities for 
corruption. These explanations are problematic as well in that they don’t inspire meaningful policy.  
Laboratory experiments on corruption have tended to find that women are significantly less 
inclined to dishonesty than men when there is risk of discovery and penalty (e.g., Schulze and Frank, 
2003).  Indeed, Croson’s and Gneezy’s (2009) survey of research upon gender differences in 
preferences concludes that “men are more risk-taking than women in most tasks and most 
populations”. If women are less prone to dishonesty than men only when there is risk of discovery 
and punishment, the recruitment of women into officialdom in corruption-wracked developing 
countries, where such risk is presumably low, is unlikely to improve governance. The explanation 
that women have less opportunity for corruption too doesn’t make for effectual policy since, as 
noted by Goetz (2007), more women in officialdom may well expand women’s opportunities for 
corruption by facilitating the formation of all-female networks of corruption or the subjugation of 
male-dominated networks by female leaders.  
In sum, statistically significant correlation between gender and corruption in cross-national 
analyses that ignore the potential endogeneity of women’s influence in the economy and politics has 
elicited problematic explanations. The explanation that women are inherently more honest than men 
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isn’t unambiguously supported by non-violent crime statistics, social science experiments, or survey-
based empirical analyses. On the other hand, while the explanations that women are more risk-
averse than men, or relatively lacking in opportunity for corruption, are plausible, they don’t make 
for effective policy solutions to the scourge of corruption in developing and transitional economies. 
 
3. The Plough and Gender Roles 
The Danish agricultural economist Esther Boserup, renowned for her pioneering work on 
gender and development, believed there was a link between agriculture by the mean of the plough 
and cultural norms governing gender roles. Her observations of rural life in the developing world led 
her to note that regions home to plough agriculture “show a predominantly male family labour 
force, because a large proportion of women in the cultivator families are completely exempted from 
work in the fields. The land is prepared for sowing by men using draught animals, and this thorough 
land preparation leaves little need for weeding the crop, which is usually the women’s task. 
Therefore women contribute mainly to harvest work and to the care of domestic animals. Because 
village women work less in agriculture, a considerable proportion of them are completely freed from 
farm work. Sometimes such women perform only domestic duties, living in seclusion within their 
own homes, and appearing in the village street only under the protection of the veil, a phenomenon 
associated with plough culture, and seemingly unknown in regions of shifting cultivation where 
women do most of the agricultural toil” (Boserup, 1970). The plough may have led to the 
masculinisation of agriculture for at least three reasons. First, it is a heavy implement drawn by 
powerful animals difficult to control. Second, since it severs the roots of weeds, its use greatly 
reduces the need for weeding, traditionally in the realm of women, and, third, since small children in 
the vicinity of its operation may be injured by it, and ploughing may not be frequently and 
unexpectedly interrupted, the plough isn’t suited to use by persons whose other responsibility is 
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childcare. Boserup theorised that, since the plough’s masculinisation of agriculture must have held as 
well in antiquity, plough cultures eventually developed beliefs that women’s proper place was the 
home, that is, norms prescribing a domestic role for women in society. This thesis has lately been 
tested by Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), who find that, even once contemporary economic 
conditions are controlled for, women’s participation in the labour force, entrepreneurship, and 
politics is lower in countries in which a larger fraction of the population is descended from ethnic 
groups who adopted the plough, and that this pattern even survives emigration in that there is less 
labour force participation among the daughters of migrants to the US and Europe from countries in 
which the ancestral use of the plough was more widespread. 
It is naturally likely that the plough was first adopted in areas ecologically suited to its use. 
Pryor (1985) distinguishes between ‘plough-positive’ and ‘plough-negative’ crops. The former, 
whose cultivation is greatly benefited by the use of the plough, are crops, such as wheat, barley, rye, 
and buckwheat, requiring large tracts of land to be rapidly prepared for sowing and soils that aren’t 
shallow, sloped, or rocky. The latter include such crops as millet and sorghum, whose seeds don’t 
need to be buried in furrows or deep holes, and corn, which is so calorie-rich that sufficient calories 
for subsistence are yielded by a relatively small plot of land. Pryor observes that ‘plough-positive’ or 
‘plough-negative’ crops may be ecologically impossible to grow in parts of the world. In other 
words, there is spatial heterogeneity in ecological suitability to crops benefited by the plough. 
Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) develop a measure of the ecological suitability of a 
nation’s ancestral lands to ‘plough-positive’ crops. First, they identify the various ethnic groups 
comprising the nation. They then procure the geographical coordinates of these groups’ ethnic 
centroids, the places whence they originated, from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas, a global database of 
1,265 ethnic groups. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn consider land within 200 kilometers of each such 
centroid the concerned ethnic group’s ancestral land. They use the UN Food and Agricultural 
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Organization’s (FAO) Global Agro-Ecological Zones 2002 database to calculate the share of each ethnic 
group’s ancestral land suited to the cultivation of ‘plough-positive’ crops. Finally, they calculate the 
share of the nation’s ancestral lands suited to ‘plough-positive’ crops as the weighted mean of the 
shares of its constituent ethnic groups’ ancestral lands suited to such crops, the weights being these 
groups’ shares in the national population. 
The use of this variable as an instrument has recent precedent. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 
(2013), concerned that their finding of a cross-national negative relationship between historical 
plough agriculture and women’s current participation in the labour force, entrepreneurship, and 
politics is driven by unobserved heterogeneity, employ the variable as an instrument for the actual 
historical use of the plough. As argued, the variable is a potential instrument as well for women’s 
participation in economic and pubic life in cross-national regressions in which a gauge of corruption 
is the dependent variable. After all, ancestral geography is likely a historical accident. On the other 
hand the suitability to ‘plough-positive’ crops, hence the actual historical use of the plough, may 
have led to more rapid economic and political development conducive to the rise of progressive 
institutions and attitudes hostile to corruption, but it is possible to mitigate this difficulty by 
controlling for both current and ancestral economic and political development. 
 
4. Data and Empirical Findings 
Table 1 presents the sample mean values of all the variable utilised in the analysis. National 
corruption is measured by the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI) for 2013. It gauges 
“perceptions of the extent to which pubic power is exercised for private gain, including petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests”. Nations 
with higher values of this indicator are perceived to be less corrupt. The CCI has been a common 
measure of national corruption in empirical work. Women’s participation in economic life is 
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measured by the national female labour force participation rate, defined as the percentage of the 
female population aged at least 15 in the labour force. Women’s participation in public life is 
measured in two ways: the percentage of ministerial level positions held by women in 2012, and the 
percentage of parliamentary seats held by women in 2013. As discussed, the study’s identifying 
instrument is the percentage of national ancestral lands suited to ‘plough-positive’ crops, that is, 
crops benefited by the use of the plough. The other variables employed in the analysis are largely 
identical, or akin, to the correlates of corruption discussed by Treisman (2007).  For example, since 
corruption may be linked to the size of economic rents appropriable by bureaucrats and politicians, 
the analysis controls for the share of natural resources rents in GDP, as well as the share of 
international trade in GDP since trade-led competition shrinks monopoly rents. Similarly, since it 
has been hypothesised that corruption in many developing nations today is a legacy of venal 
extractive forms of colonialism, dummy variables describing historical colonial status are included in 
the analysis, as is the share of the population descended from Europeans since European settlement 
in former colonies was typically accompanied by the founding of beneficent institutions.  
In order to minimise the possibility of correlation between this instrument and unobserved 
progressive institutions and attitudes arising from the perhaps more rapid economic and political 
development generated by the use of the plough, measures of both current and ancestral economic 
and political development are included in the analysis. Current levels of economic and political 
development are measured, respectively, by per capita income and the Polity democracy score. 
Ancestral economic and political development are controlled for as follows. An ethnic group’s level 
of ancestral economic development is measured by an index of its historical settlement pattern taken 
from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas. It ranges in value from 1 to 8, with 1 representing a fully 
nomadic existence and 8 complex settlement. For each nation, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) 
calculate the weighted average of the values of this index pertaining to its constituent ethnicities, the 
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weights being the population shares of these ethnicities. In like fashion, an ethnic group’s level of 
ancestral political development is gauged by an index of its levels of political hierarchy. This index, 
also taken from the Ethnographic Atlas, ranges in value from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating no jurisdictional 
hierarchies beyond the local community and 5 indicating four levels of such hierarchies. For each 
nation, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) similarly compute the weighted average of the values of 
this index pertaining to its constituent ethnicities. 
Table 2 presents baseline OLS estimates of the determinants of corruption. These are 
indicative of a statistically significant connection between gender and corruption across countries: 
those in which more women participate in the labour force and a greater share of ministerial level 
positions and parliamentary seats are held by women are perceived to be less corrupt.  Table 3 
presents OLS estimates relating to the baseline regression equations augmented to include a variety 
of historical controls of which the aforementioned measures of nations’ ancestral levels of economic 
and political development are a part. Once again, the potentially erroneous treatment of the 
regressors gauging women’s representation in the labour force and politics as exogenous yields a 
statistically significant positive relationship between each and the CCI. Next, variables gauging 
contemporary economic conditions are added as regressors. The ensuing estimates, presented in 
table 4, too indicate that the ignoring of the potential endogeneity of women’s participation in 
economic and public life results in a statistically significant association between gender and 
corruption. Table 5 presents OLS estimates pertaining to the regression equations thus far 
augmented to include a selection of socio-cultural controls. As before, the treatment as exogenous 
of women’s participation in the labour force and their representation in ministerial cabinets results in 
their statistical significance. However, it appears that controlling for the fraction of Protestants in 
the population turns women’s representation in parliament statistically insignificant. This is probably 
because the Protestant nations of Northern Europe are characterised by both very low levels of 
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corruption (high values of the CCI) and high women’s representation in parliament.  It is notable 
that neither Swamy et al. (2001) nor Dollar et al. (2001) control for the extent of Protestantism. 
Weber (1930) famously wrote of a ‘Protestant Ethic’ whose hallmark was worldly asceticism. Indeed, 
Weber describes Protestants as having abolished the Catholic monasteries only to turn the world 
into one. It is likely that this way of life was inimical to corruption. Further, as described by Berger 
(2010), Pentecostal Protestants in Latin America seem to have fostered a culture less sexist than that 
of their Catholic compatriots. In other words, Protestantism may be associated with more egalitarian 
gender norms. Hence, the omission of this control by Swamy et al. (2001) and Dollar et al. (2001) 
may have led to their overestimation of the effect of women’s parliamentary representation upon 
measured corruption.  In sum, once socio-cultural factors are extensively controlled for, only the 
female labour force participation rate and the percentage of ministerial level positions held by 
women, treated as exogenous, remain statistically significant correlates of perceived corruption. This 
study shall next explore the robustness of these two variables’ statistical significance to IV 
estimation. 
In keeping with Boserup’s (1970) hypothesis, the estimates in table 6 indicate that ancestral 
geographical suitability to crops benefited by the use of the plough is significantly negatively 
associated with women’s representation in the labour force and politics. Hence, not only is ancestral 
geography likely exogenous, it is also strongly correlated with these potentially endogenous measures 
of women’s economic and political influence. Table 7 presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimates, analogous to the OLS estimates in columns (1) and (2) of table 5, the identifying 
instrument being nations’ ancestral suitability to ‘plough-positive’ crops. By these, neither women’s 
participation in the labour force nor their representation in ministerial cabinets is a significant 
correlate of perceived corruption. Note that the 2SLS point estimates of these regressors are, 
respectively, 89% and 91% smaller than their OLS counterparts. It is concluded that OLS estimates 
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of the effects of gender upon corruption are substantially biased. These IV estimates also indicate 
that there is significantly less corruption in countries with greater per capita incomes, and, curiously, 
more corruption in countries whose adult populations are more educated. Perhaps its lack of 
emphasis upon ethics is a weakness of modern education. Corruption is perceived to be significantly 
lower in more open economies, and higher in nations more ethnically fractionalised. Finally, both 
Christianity and Islam appear associated with less corruption. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The principal contribution of this paper to the body of research upon gender and corruption 
is its treatment of women’s participation in economic and public life as endogenous. As argued, such 
endogeneity may be the result of unobserved influences upon corruption being factors also in 
women’s representation in the labour force and politics, or the consequence of reverse causality, that 
is, the effect of corruption upon women’s ease of entry into the labour force or politics. Previous 
attempts to address this endogeneity, OLS with country fixed-effects (Debski and Jetter, 2015) and 
instrumental variables estimation (Chen, 2013), have not been convincing. On the other hand, this 
study’s use of ancestral geography, arguably a historical accident, as the identifying instrument in IV 
estimation of the effects of gender upon corruption is a plausible strategy. The ensuing estimates 
indicate that gender is a statistically insignificant correlate of corruption. Hence, this study’s findings 
are not supportive of policy initiatives to increase women’s influence in economic and public life 
toward combatting corruption. While such initiatives remain valuable, their value may lie in their 
promotion of equity, not efficiency. 
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Table 1 
Sample Means 
 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. 
The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013 (negatively related to 
perceived corruption) 
207 -0.008 0.998 
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%) – The World Bank 186 52.766 16.060 
percentage of ministerial level positions held by women in 2012 – The World Bank 184 17.180 11.917 
percentage of parliamentary seats held by women 2013 – The World Bank 187 19.728 11.684 
percentage of national ancestral lands suited to ‘plough-positive’ crops – Alesina, 
Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) 
203 0.485 0.414 
log of per capita gross national income PPP in 2013 – The World Bank 188 8.666 1.464 
average years of schooling in 2010 of those 15 or older - Barro and Lee (2013) 146 8.347 2.810 
Polity2 index of democracy in 2013 – Center for Systemic Peace  165 4.188 6.159 
former British colony 194 0.327 0.469 
former French colony 196 0.153 0.401 
never colonised 195 0.144 0.352 
formerly (or currently) a communist country 241 0.216 0.412 
proportion of national ancestral lands suited to agriculture – Alesina, Giuliano, and 
Nunn (2013) 
215 54.189 33.387 
ancestral political development (index of hierarchical levels) – Alesina, Giuliano, 
and Nunn (2013) 
228 3.304 1.040 
ancestral economic development (index of settlement patterns) – Alesina, Giuliano, 
and Nunn (2013) 
228 6.380 1.381 
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP in 2013 – The World Bank 180 10.531 13.383 
international trade as a percentage of GDP in 2013 – The World Bank 176 95.003 54.272 
value added in agriculture as a percentage of GDP in 2013 – The World Bank 164 12.942 12.247 
value added in industry as a percentage of GDP in 2013 – The World Bank 164 28.220 13.727 
percentage of national land area that is potentially arable - FAO 161 42.724 27.591 
measure of national ethnic fractionalisation – Alesina, Devleeschauwer, and 
Easterly (2003) 
189 0.441 0.258 
percentage of the population of European descent – Nunn and Puga (2012) 169 32.201 41.715 
percentage of Catholics in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006) 189 0.289 0.332 
percentage of Protestants in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006) 189 0.139 0.209 
percentage of other Christian sects in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006) 189 0.085 0.112 
percentage of Muslims in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006) 189 0.233 0.346 
percentage of Hindus in the population – McCleary and Barro (2006) 189 0.022 0.095 
continent = Asia 240 0.221 0.416 
continent = Europe 240 0.208 0.407 
continent = North America 240 0.163 0.370 
continent = Oceania 240 0.108 0.311 
continent = South America 240 0.063 0.243 
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Table 2 
Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country Estimates –  
Baseline Controls 
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013 
Variable OLS Coefficient Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -6.056*** -5.046*** -5.175*** 
 (0.435) (0.319) (0.369) 
Key Regressors    
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%)  0.014***   
- The World Bank (0.004)   
percentage ministerial level positions held by women in 2012   0.022***  
- The World Bank  (0.005)  
percentage parliamentary seats held by women in 2013    0.014** 
- The World Bank   (0.006) 
Baseline Controls    
log of per capita gross national income PPP in 2013  0.666*** 0.570*** 0.603*** 
- The World Bank (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) 
average years of schooling in 2010 of those 15 or older  -0.061* -0.041 -0.043 
- Barro and Lee (2013) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) 
Polity2 index of democracy in 2013 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 
- Center for Systemic Peace (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Continent dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.71 0.72 0.69 
N 131 127 127 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3 
Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country Estimates –  
Baseline & Historical Controls 
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013 
Variable OLS Coefficient Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -6.175*** -5.591*** -5.830*** 
 (0.530) (0.484) (0.505) 
Key Regressors    
percentage ministerial level positions held by women in 2012  0.013***   
- The World Bank (0.004)   
percentage parliamentary seats held by women in 2013   0.021***  
- The World Bank  (0.005)  
percentage of women in parliament 2013    0.017** 
- The World Bank   (0.006) 
Historical Controls    
former British colony 0.190 0.095 0.158 
 (0.169) (0.183) (0.173) 
former French colony 0.176 0.161 0.095 
 (0.173) (0.189) (0.187) 
never colonised 0.081 -0.008 0.099 
 (0.217) (0.198) (0.206) 
formerly (or currently) a communist country -0.192 -0.099 -0.074 
 (0.181) (0.166) (0.151) 
proportion of national ancestral lands suited to  0.002 0.004* 0.004* 
agriculture - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ancestral political development (index of hierarchical -0.010 -0.054 -0.071 
levels) - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) (0.079) (0.074) (0.073) 
ancestral economic development (index of settlement 0.047 0.084** 0.111** 
patterns) - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) 
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.71 0.73 0.71 
N 128 124 124 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4 
Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country Estimates –  
Baseline, Historical, & Contemporary Economic Controls 
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013 
Variable OLS Coefficient Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -5.764*** -6.133*** -5.942*** 
 (0.854) (0.836) (0.913) 
Key Regressors    
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%)  0.013***   
- The World Bank (0.004)   
percentage ministerial level positions held by women in 2012   0.019***  
- The World Bank  (0.005)  
percentage parliamentary seats held by women in 2013    0.012** 
- The World Bank   (0.006) 
Contemporary Economic Controls    
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP in 2013  -0.012* -0.014** -0.007 
- The World Bank (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
international trade as a percentage of GDP in 2013  0.003** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
- The World Bank (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
value added in agriculture as a percentage of GDP in 2013  0.005 0.015* 0.011 
- The World Bank (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
value added in industry as a percentage of GDP in 2013  -0.012 -0.005 -0.012 
- The World Bank (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
percentage of national land area that is potentially arable  -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
- FAO (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Historical Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.78 0.79 0.77 
N 108 105 104 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 
Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country Estimates – 
Baseline, Historical, Contemporary Economic, & Socio-Cultural Controls 
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013 
Variable OLS Coefficient Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -6.433*** -6.128*** -5.380*** 
 (0.962) (0.985) (1.115) 
Key Regressors    
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%)  0.018***   
- The World Bank (0.005)   
percentage ministerial level positions held by women in 2012   0.016***  
- The World Bank  (0.006)  
percentage parliamentary seats held by women in 2013    0.003 
- The World Bank   (0.006) 
Socio-Cultural Controls    
measure of national ethnic fractionalisation  -0.601** -0.631*** -0.547** 
- Alesina, Devleeschauwer, and Easterly (2003) (0.228) (0.225) (0.252) 
percentage of the population of European descent -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
- Nunn and Puga (2012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
percentage of Catholics in the population  0.383 0.227 0.292 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.233) (0.251) (0.265) 
percentage of Protestants in the population  1.286*** 0.918*** 1.390*** 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.306) (0.346) (0.361) 
percentage of other Christian sects in the population  0.948* 0.937* 0.585 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.560) (0.542) (0.678) 
percentage of Muslims in the population  0.986*** 0.490** 0.398 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.288) (0.238) (0.255) 
percentage of Hindus in the population  0.961* 0.492 0.575 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.530) (0.366) (0.388) 
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Historical Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Contemporary Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0.82 0.81 0.80 
N 108 105 104 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6 
Women and the Plough 
Variable Dependent Variable 
 female labour 
force 
participation rate 
% of women in 
ministerial level 
positions 
 OLS Coefficient Estimates 
Constant 36.748* 12.862 
 (20.207) (19.987) 
Identifying Instrument   
percentage of national ancestral lands suited to  -16.682*** -14.786*** 
‘plough-positive’ crops - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn 
(2013) 
(5.112) (4.905) 
Baseline Controls Yes Yes 
Historical Controls Yes Yes 
Contemporary Economic Controls Yes Yes 
Socio-Cultural Controls Yes Yes 
   
Adjusted R-squared  0.63 0.48 
N 108 105 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7 
Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country IV Estimates –  
Baseline, Historical, Contemporary Economic, & Socio-Cultural Controls 
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013 
Variable 2SLS Coeff. Ests. 
Constant -6.141*** -5.996*** 
 (0.866) (0.825) 
Key Regressors   
female labour force participation rate in 2013 (%) - The World Bank 0.011  
 (0.013)  
percentage of ministerial level positions held by women in 2012   0.009 
- The World Bank  (0.014) 
Baseline Controls   
log of per capita gross national income PPP in 2013  0.716*** 0.721*** 
- The World Bank (0.081) (0.083) 
average years of schooling in 2010 of those 15 or older  -0.065** -0.072** 
- Barro and Lee (2013) (0.030) (0.028) 
Polity2 index of democracy in 2013 0.019* 0.012 
- Center for Systemic Peace (0.010) (0.012) 
Continent dummy variables Yes Yes 
Historical Controls   
former British colony -0.071 -0.046 
 (0.134) (0.143) 
former French colony -0.064 -0.040 
 (0.149) (0.160) 
never colonised 0.022 0.033 
 (0.142) (0.150) 
formerly (or currently) a communist country 0.133 0.141 
 (0.147) (0.145) 
proportion of national ancestral lands suited to  -0.003 -0.000 
agriculture - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) (0.004) (0.002) 
ancestral political development (index of hierarchical 0.047 0.025 
levels) - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) (0.070) (0.072) 
ancestral economic development (index of settlement 0.011 0.011 
patterns) - Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) (0.046) (0.046) 
Contemporary Economic Controls   
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP in 2013  -0.008 -0.008 
- The World Bank (0.006) (0.007) 
international trade as a percentage of GDP in 2013  0.004*** 0.004*** 
- The World Bank (0.001) (0.001) 
value added in agriculture as a percentage of GDP in 2013  0.005 0.014 
- The World Bank (0.010) (0.009) 
value added in industry as a percentage of GDP in 2013  -0.018** -0.014 
- The World Bank (0.007) (0.009) 
percentage of national land area that is potentially arable  -0.000 0.001 
- FAO (0.002) (0.002) 
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Table 7 (contd.) 
Gender and Corruption: Cross-Country IV Estimates –  
Baseline, Historical, Contemporary Economic, & Socio-Cultural Controls 
Dependent Variable = The World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator for 2013 
Variable 2SLS Coeff. Ests. 
Socio-Cultural Controls   
measure of national ethnic fractionalisation  -0.571*** -0.582** 
- Alesina, Devleeschauwer, and Easterly (2003) (0.203) (0.229) 
percentage of the population of European descent -0.002 -0.001 
- Nunn and Puga (2012) (0.004) (0.004) 
percentage of Catholics in the population  0.376* 0.309 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.203) (0.275) 
percentage of Protestants in the population  1.353*** 1.188* 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.299) (0.640) 
percentage of other Christian sects in the population  0.909* 0.858* 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.478) (0.493) 
percentage of Muslims in the population  0.763* 0.470** 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.437) (0.203) 
percentage of Hindus in the population  0.756 0.467 
- McCleary and Barro (2006) (0.598) (0.335) 
   
Adjusted R-squared  0.82 0.81 
N 108 105 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Notes 
1. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail#myAnchor7 
2. Plato believed that “women have an inferior virtue than men” and Aristotle that “women lack 
moral virtue in the same moderation”. 
3. 4th century BC 
4. https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-42 
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